Representation theory thesis

Thus we may distinguish different grades of representationalism about sensory qualities. Pure representationalism would be the view that representation alone suffices for a sensory quality. But no one holds that view, for the reason just given: representation alone is cheap and ubiquitous.

But only more recently has it begun playing a wider role in the philosophy of mind, particularly in theories of consciousness. Indeed, there are now multiple representational theories of consciousness, corresponding to different uses of the term “conscious,” each attempting to explain the corresponding phenomenon in terms of representation.

The (strong) representational theory entails the obvious supervenience claim: that there can be no difference in sensory qualities without a representational difference. Objections to the theory have most often come in the form of counterexamples to that thesis. But we shall begin with four more general complaints.

Representational Theories of Consciousness. The aim of a representationalist theory of consciousness is to extend the treatment of intentionality to that of consciousness, showing that if intentionality is well understood in representational terms, then so can be the phenomena of consciousness in the relevant sense.